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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
John Henry Rivera appeals from his conviction for grand theft, asserting that the
district court erred by denying his motion for mistrial and overruling an objection made
during the prosecutor's closing arguments.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
For a few months over a summer, Rivera worked with Ms. Vicki Hulsizer and
others at the Forest Service.

(Tr., p.46, L.17 - p.48, L.12; p.53, L.1 - p.54, L.13.)

Rivera stole Ms. Hulsizer's wallet because he did not like her. (Tr., p.92, Ls.5-17.) He
took the wallet and hid it in the ceiling of the men's restroom. (Tr., p.92, L.23 - p.93,
L.1.) Later that same day, Ms. Hulsizer realized that her wallet was missing. (Tr., p.55,
L.22 - p.56, L.1.) She was very concerned, as her wallet contained several personal
and government issued financial transaction cards. (Tr., p.57, L.23 - p.60, L.3.) She
immediately called the supervisor's office to cancel the government transaction cards,
worked on cancelling her personal cards, and then retraced her steps searching for the
·wallet

(Tr., p.60, L.24-p.61, LB; p.66, Ls.11-25.)

Ms. Hulsizer also checked the

women's restroom, asked others to search the men's. and then went outside to look
through the garbage. (Tr., p.67, Ls.1-11.) Rivera, who had stolen the wallet, "helped"
Ms. Hulsizer search for it by sifting through the outside garbage cans. (Tr., p.49, L.3
p.50, L.2; p.67, Ls.12-22.)
A few days after the theft, Rivera stopped showing up for work. (Tr., p.50, L.22 p.51, L.16.) Months later, Rivera was invited to the police station where he submitted to
an interview with police and, after some prevarication, admitted that he took Ms.
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Hulsizer's wallet.

(Tr., p.96, Ls.4-8.) The State charged Rivera with grand theft for

taking the financial transaction cards with the intent to deprive them from Ms. Hulsizer.
(R., pp.50-51.) Rivera pied not guilty and went to trial. (R., pp.56-58.)

During the prosecutor's opening statement, he told the jury, "You are going to
hear testimony today about (Rivera's] habits as an employee. He was argumentative
and unsatisfactory in his performance." (Tr., p.29, Ls.21-23.) Rivera's defense counsel
objected, claiming that the prosecutor's statement was impermissible 404(b) evidence,
and moved for a mistrial pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. (Tr., p.30, L.15 - p.32,
L.10.) The district court, noting that opening statements are argument, not evidence,
denied the motion because it could not "come to the conclusion that Mr. Rivera (was]
not capable of receiving a fair trial." (Tr., p.34, L.20

p.36, L.24.)

During closing arguments, as the prosecutor explained how the evidence that
Ms. Hulsizer's wallet had been hidden in the wall of the men's restroom supported the
inference that Rivera had intended to permanently deprive her of it (Tr., p.159, Ls.3-12),
defense counsel again objected on the grounds that it was a "personal statement;
vouching" (Tr., p.159, Ls.13-14).

The district court overruled the objection, and the

prosecutor continued. (Tr., p.159, Ls.15-18.)
After the trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the grand theft charge. (Tr.,
p.171, Ls.22-24; R., p.123.)

The district court entered judgment of conviction and

imposed a suspended sentence of four years with one and a half years fixed, placing
Rivera on two years of probation. (R., pp.164-67; but

Tr., p.186, Ls.6-10 (two years

fixed).) Rivera filed a timely notice of appeal. (Notice of Appeal (Augmentation).)
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ISSUES
Rivera states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Rivera's motion for a
mistrial?
2.
Should Mr. Rivera's conviction be vacated based on the State's
objected-to misconduct during closing arguments?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The State rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Rivera failed to establish any error by the district court in denying Rivera's
motion for a mistrial where the State did not make an improper opening statement and
Rivera was not deprived of his right to a fair trial?
2.
Has Rivera failed to establish that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct
during closing arguments?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Rivera has Failed to Show Error in the District Court's Denial of His Motion for a Mistrial

A.

Introduction
During the prosecutor's opening statement, Rivera's defense counsel moved for

a mistrial, asserting that the prosecutor had referenced evidence that was inadmissible
under Rule 404(b). (Tr., p.30, L.15 - p.32, L.10.) The district court, after hearing the
motion, found that Rivera had not been deprived of a fair trial and denied the motion.
(Tr., p.34, L.18 - p.36, L.24.) On appeal, Rivera argues that the district court erred in
reaching that determination. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-14.) When viewed in the context of
the entire trial, Rivera has failed to establish error or that he was deprived of a fair trial.
Therefore, the district court's proper exercise of its discretion should be affirmed.

B.

Standard of Review
On appeal, the standard for review on a motion for mistrial is well-established:
[TJhe question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of the circumstances existing when the
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the
event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible
error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion
for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion"
standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of
reversible error. [The Court's} focus is upon the continuing impact on the
trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's
refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible error.

State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v.
Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95,665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983)). Rivera bears the
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burden of showing that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his
motion for a mistrial. State v. Ellis, 99 Idaho 606, 608, 586 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1978);
State v. Rodriguez, 106 Idaho 30, 33, 674 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 1983).

C.

Rivera has Failed to Establish an Abuse of the District Court's Discretion In
Denying his Motion for a Mistrial
Motions for mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. State v. Barcella,

135 Idaho 191, 197, 16 P.3d 288, 294 (Ct. App. 2000). Under part (a) of that rule, "[a]
mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the
trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the
courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair
trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a). Thus, the error or legal defect triggering the mistrial motion must
be sufficiently prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial before granting the
motion is appropriate. When viewed in the context of the whole trial, Rivera has failed
to establish either error during opening statements or prejudice that deprived him of a
fair trial.
1.

The Prosecutor's Opening Statement did not Introduce Error into the
Proceedings

When considering the denial of a motion for mistrial that arises out of argument,
"[t]he threshold inquiry is whether the state introduced error." State v. Grantham, 146
Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Shepherd, 124 Idaho at 57,
855 P.2d at 894). It is not error, however, for a prosecutor to refer to evidence during
opening statements that he has a good faith basis for believing will be admissible at
trial.

United States v. Chirinos, 112 F.3d 1089, 1098-99 (11th Cir. 1997) (not
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misconduct to refer to Rule 404(b) evidence subsequently ruled inadmissible by court).
"It is generally held that statements by counsel that certain evidence will be introduced
are not improper if made in good faith and with reasonable ground to believe that the
evidence is admissible, even though the intended proof referred to is afterward
excluded." Mattson v. Bryan, 92 Idaho 587, 592, 448 P.2d 201, 206 (1968). Because
Rivera has failed to establish that the prosecution lacked reasonable grounds to believe
that the evidence referred to in opening statements was admissible, he has failed to
show that the prosecutor introduced any error into the proceedings.
The State's theory of the case was that Rivera stole Ms. Hulsizer's wallet, not to
benefit himself, but to harm her because of a tumultuous employment relationship. To
that end, the prosecutor explained during opening statements:
Now, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are going to hear evidence
today that the defendant in this case, Mr. Rivera, worked for the U.S.
Forest Service last summer. You are going to hear from four witnesses.
The first witness you are going to here [sic] from is Cindy; Cindy Carter.
She was Mr. Rivera's supervisor while he was employed at the Forest
Service. You are going to hear from Ms. Hulsizer who worked with the
defendant at the Forest Service who had her wallet stolen. You are going
to hear from Deputy Rory
Detective Rory - with the Coeur d'Alene
Police Department, who was the detective assigned to investigate the
theft. And last, you are going to hear from a witness named Patrick
joint investigation with the Coeur d'Alene Police Department.
Through their testimonies, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are going
to hear the truth of what happened. The evidence will show that Mr.
Rivera was employed, as I said, in 2009, the summer, at the Fernan
Ranger Station, which is operated by the U.S. Forest Service. You are
going to hear testimony today about his habits as an employee. He was
argumentative and unsatisfactory in his performance.
(Tr., p.28, L.25

p.29, L.23.)
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The prosecutor had several good faith bases to believe that evidence showing
that Rivera was "argumentative and unsatisfactory in his performance" was not
proscribed under Rule 404(b). Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution in a
criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, or the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
I.R.E. 404(b) (emphasis added).
Under the State's theory of the case, Rivera's employment performance did not
constitute "other crimes, wrongs, or acts," but was the root cause of the acrimonious
relationship that led to Rivera stealing Ms. Hulsizer's wallet (see Tr., p.33, Ls.5-14), and
therefore intrinsic to the crime. As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, Rule 404(b)
"does not extend to evidence of acts which are intrinsic to the charged offense." State
v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228, 178 P.3d 28, 31 (2008). "Evidence of an act is intrinsic
when it and evidence of the crime charged are inextricably intertwined, or both acts are
part of a single criminal episode, or it was a necessary preliminary to the crime
charged."

Jil; see also State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410, 413, 49 P.3d 1260, 1263 (Ct. App.

2002) ("The Idaho appellate courts have held that I.R.E. 404(b) does not prevent the
introduction of other misconduct evidence if the misconduct was so interconnected with
the charged offense that a complete account of the charged offense could not be given
to the jury without disclosure of the uncharged misconduct.") (citing State v. Izatt, 96
Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1975); State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17-18,
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878 P.2d 188, 191-192 (Ct. App. 1994)). Because Rivera's acrimonious employment
relationship with Ms. Hulsizer led to his stealing her wallet, there is a good faith
argument that the employment performance that created the acrimony was intrinsic to
the crime and therefore not proscribed by Rule 404(b).
Moreover, if being argumentative or unsatisfactory in one's job performance
constitute "wrongs" or "bad acts," argumentativeness and poor job performance do not
tend "to show that [Rivera] acted in conformity therewith" when committing a theft.
Although evidence that Rivera was a bad employee may have had some generalized
prejudice, it did not tend to show that Rivera was a thief, and therefore Rule 404(b) does
not apply. There is therefore a good faith argument that, under the very language of the
Rule, Rule 404(b) would not have excluded this evidence.
Finally, even if the admissibility of such evidence is governed by Rule 404(b), the
prosecutor had a good faith basis for believing that the evidence was admissible under
that Rule in order to establish Rivera's motive and absence of mistake or accident in
committing the crime.
The district court acknowledged that the prosecutor had a good faith basis for
believing the evidence could be admissible when it said:
Certainly, there could be an argument that offering evidence about the
argumentative nature or Mr. Rivera's unsatisfactory work performance
may or may not be relevant to this proceeding. I don't know how that's
going to pan out. I do understand that there is some kind of acrimony that
existed between the coworkers, between the defendant, and the alleged
victim in this case. That may certainly be part of the whole picture of this
case, but, clearly, I don't know that it would be proper for the State to go
into any great depth in this case as to the argumentative nature or the
unsatisfactory work that Mr. Rivera may have provided any more than the
defense would be able to disparage the character of the work traits of the
alleged victim in this case. So those are really areas that there may be

8

some related relevance to the acrimony between the parties, as I
understand the allegations and the offer of proof in this case. But certainly
I don't know that it's necessary to go into that in any great detail, and I'm
not sure how the Court will rule on that if that is evidence that the going to
be offered.
(Tr., p.35, Ls.5-25.)
Although the district court clearly had concerns with the scope of the admissibility
1

of evidence regarding Rivera s argumentative nature and poor job performance, it
acknowledged that there was a proper argument that at least some of that evidence
could be admitted. Rivera has not argued, much less shown, error in the district court's
conclusion that there was an argument for admission of the evidence.
brief, pp.9-11.)

(Appellant's

Because it is not error to merely mention evidence during opening

statements that is later ruled inadmissible, and error occurs only when there was no
good faith basis to believe that the evidence was admissible, Rivera has failed to
establish error, much less an abuse of discretion, in the district court's denial of his
motion for a mistrial.
2.

Rivera has Failed to Establish that He was Deprived of a Fair Trial

Error alone is not sufficient in order to grant a mistrial; the error must prejudice
the defendant so as to deprive him of the ability to receive a fair trial. I.C.R. 29.1. "The
right to due process does not guarantee the defendant an error-free trial, but rather a
fair one." Grantham, 146 Idaho at 498, 198 P.3d at 136 (citing Shepherd, 124 Idaho at
58, 855 P.2d at 895). Even were this Court to find that the prosecutor introduced error
by stating that Rivera "was argumentative and unsatisfactory in his performance,"
Rivera has still failed to establish that such error deprived him of the ability to receive a
fair trial.
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As the district court noted in denying the motion for mistrial:
At any rate, assuming for the fact of this argument here that reference by
the State to Mr. Rivera as being argumentative and unsatisfactory in his
performance as being an objectionable statement and inappropriate under
a 404(b) standard, I have to look and recognize that the State's argument
is just that. It is argument. It is not evidence that is to be offered or
accepted by the jury. And while certainly that statement may have some
arguable impact upon the jury that cannot be unrung, I don't think at this
particular stage of the process that the Court can come to the conclusion
that Mr. Rivera is not capable of receiving a fair trial. The jurors have
been instructed as to what they're supposed to consider as evidence,
they'll continue to be instructed on that, and I don't think that this misstep,
assuming that it is a misstep, is sufficient enough to let this Court be
concerned about Mr. Rivera's right to a speedy [sic] trial.
(Tr., p.36, Ls.1-18.) Even assuming, arguendo, that the prosecutor introduced error, the
district court correctly determined that jury instructions regarding the differences
between evidence and argument cured any potential prejudice.
The district court properly instructed the jury, both orally and in the written
instructions, at least three separate times that the attorneys' opening statements were
not evidence. These instructions included Instruction No.1:
Just as the opening statements are not evidence, neither are the closing
arguments.
IT-

\ 11.

1

- "'l-1
JJ
. .:. 1 1

I - A ,t "'). D
,t "'l"7 \
L-:>."1-- r.:., r-., /J· 1.:.t .J

n.
Iv.

1--~-• --~:-- " ' - ,t

111-:>llU\.,llVII l'IV.

As members of the jury it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to
apply those facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the
facts from all the evidence presented in the case.
The evidence you are to consider consists of, 1, sworn testimony of
witnesses; 2, exhibits which have been admitted into evidence, and 3, any
facts to which the parties have stipulated.
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including:
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1, arguments and statements by the lawyers. The lawyers are not
witnesses. What they say in their opening statements, closing arguments
and at other times is included to help you interpret the evidence, but is not
evidence. If the facts as you remember them differ from the way the
lawyers have stated them, follow your memory.
(Tr., p.152, L.10-p.153, L.1; R., p.148.) Instruction No.20:
The arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence. If you
remember the facts differently from the way the attorneys have stated
them, you should base your decision on what you remember.
(Tr., p.154, L.24 - p.155, L.2; R., p.150.) This Court presumes that the jury followed the
district court's instructions. State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 222, 207 P.3d 186, 198
(Ct. App. 2009); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App.
1996) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989)).
Therefore, even if the prosecutor introduced error, instructions that the jury was to
decide the case on the evidence and that the prosecutor's opening statement was not
evidence would have ensured that Rivera could still receive a fair trial.
Rivera's claim that the district court erred in not declaring a mistrial is
unsupported by the applicable authorities. As the Idaho Court of Appeals has noted,
even "[t]he admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the

where inadmissible evidence is actually introduced into a trial, as long as the district
court promptly instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, the Court presumes that
the jury obeyed the court's instruction. See State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631, 97 P.3d
1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004) ("We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction
to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an
'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to follow that court's instructions,
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and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be 'devastating' to the
defendant.") (quoting Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987)).

Rivera has not

argued that there is any probability, let alone an overwhelming probability, that the jury
was unable to follow the district court's proper instructions.
If the Court will presume that the jury will follow an instruction to disregard actual
evidence that has been presented to it, then it must presume in a case where mere
argument was presented and the jury was instructed three times that argument was not
evidence, that the jury followed the district court's instructions.

"[TJhe constitution

entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).

If there was any error in the prosecutor's opening

statements, Jury Instructions Nos. 1, 19, and 20 would have had the effect of curing any
potential prejudice that could have resulted, preserving Rivera's right to a fair trial.

D.

Harmless Error
Finally, even if this Court should reach the question of harmless error, it can say

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming
evidence of guilt presented to the jury. "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. The standard for
determining whether error is harmless is whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the error contributed to the jury's verdict "and that the court must be able to declare a
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477,
488, 873 P.2d 122, 133 (1994); State v. Fernandez, 124 Idaho 381, 383-84, 859 P.2d
1389, 1391-92 (1993) (citations omitted). "An error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt if the Court can conclude, based upon the evidence and argument presented
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during the trial, that the jury would have reached the same result absent the error."
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,471,163 P.3d 1175, 1183 (2007) (citing State v.
Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 71 P.3d 1055 (2003)).
At issue is the prosecutor's statement that the jury would "hear testimony today
about [Rivera's] habits as an employee.

He was argumentative and unsatisfactory in

his performance." This was not a civil trial for wrongful termination; it was a criminal trial
for grand theft. Considering the overwhelming evidence that Rivera stole Ms. Hulsizer's
wallet and hid it in the ceiling of the men's restroom because he did not like her,
including Rivera's recorded confession of the crime, this Court can say beyond a
reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's comment referring to Rivera's negative work
performance did not contribute to the jury's ultimate verdict.

II.
Rivera has Failed to Establish that the Prosecutor Committed Misconduct

A.

Introduction
Rivera argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by "inappropriate[ly]

insert[ing] his personal opinion and facts not in evidence regarding the significance of
the location of the wallet" during closing arguments.
Rivera's argument is without merit.

(Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.)

When viewed in context, the prosecutor's

challenged statement can only be seen as commenting on logical inferences that could
be drawn from the evidence that was presented at trial, and Rivera has failed to
establish that that is misconduct. The district court should be affirmed.

13

B.

Standard of Review
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct was
improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. Romero-Garcia, 139
Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003).
Even after a finding of prosecutorial misconduct, a conviction will not be set aside
for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results
of the trial. See State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 367-68, 972 P.2d 737, 745-46 (Ct. App.
1998). "The right to due process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but
a fair one." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d 1002, 1008 (Ct. App.
1991 ). Similarly, the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for
misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the
defendant's right to a fair trial."

&

If the jury would have reached the same result had

the prosecutor's error not occurred, the error is deemed harmless.

C.

&

The Prosecutor's Comments During Closing Arguments did not Amount to
Prosecutorial Misconduct
A prosecutor has considerable latitude in presenting closing argument, including

the right to discuss the evidence and the inferences arising from the evidence. State v.
Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127, 141 (1997). The purpose of the prosecutor's
closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the jurors remember and interpret the
evidence. Reynolds, 120 Idaho at 450, 816 P.2d at 1007. The prosecutor can discuss
"the evidence, pointing out discrepancies and conflicts in the testimony, and argue that
the evidence in the record supports and justifies a conviction."
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&

The prosecutor can

also make remarks based on the record, which concern matters of general knowledge
or experience. ~; see also AB.A. Standard 5.9.
Statements alleged to constitute prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed by the
Court in context.

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974); State v.

Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009).
recognized

the

importance of reviewing

closing

The Court has also

arguments

in

light of their

improvisational nature, noting that "in reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
[the Court] must keep in mind the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571,
165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d
128, 132-33 (1986)).
Rivera has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor exceeded the considerable
latitude granted him in closing argument. When viewed in context, it is clear that the
prosecutor did not offer an impermissible personal statement or "insert facts not in the
record" as Rivera argues.

Rather, the prosecutor properly discussed the evidence

presented at trial and reasonable inferences that should arise from that evidence.
In context, the prosecutor said, ''Ladies and gentlemen, when John Rivera
reached into Vicki Hulsizer's purse and took her wallet, he committed grand theft." (Tr.,
p.157, L.24 - p.158, L.1.) The prosecutor continued his argument, explaining that this
was a simple case. and outlined the elements that the State was required to prove,
most of which were undisputed. (Tr., p.158, L.5 - p.159, L.2.) On the disputed fifth
element, that Rivera took the wallet with the intent to deprive the owner of it, the
prosecutor argued that "[w]e know he did this in three ways."
The first is his actions. He took a wallet to the men's bathroom, a place
where Vicki can't even go, and put it in the ceiling. Now, you heard
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testimony that they actually found it in the wall. I can think of no better
place to put that wallet in that building to hide it permanently.
(Tr., p.159, Ls.7-12.)

Here, defense counsel objected, "That's a personal statement;

vouching." (Tr., p.159, Ls.13-14.) The Court overruled the objection (Tr., p.159, L.15),
and the prosecutor continued:
If you wanted to permanently deprive, there's no better place to put it than
in that wall.
Second is the conduct of the defendant himself. On the day it went
missing, he went through the garbage. He helped look for the wallet
knowing full well where it was. His employment ended shortly thereafter.
There was no anonymous e-mail, no tips, no indication, nothing to tell
Vickie or the Forest Service where that wallet was.
Approximately two months later when he was called by the Coeur d'Alene
Police Department to come down for an interview, he did. And at first, if
you go back and review what has been admitted into evidence, the
interview, he denies it; I had nothing to do with it. Only after additional
questioning did he finally say, yes, I took the wallet and, yes, I put it in the
ceiling. That demonstrates his intent to permanently deprive.
And, third, we have his own statements that indicated his intent. He said
in the interview it was because she was b****y. He took that wallet
intending to deprive Vickie of it, intending to victimize Vickie because she
was b****y. And that speaks to his intent to permanently deprive.

reiterating that the State had proved all five elements of the crime and asking the jury
"to return a verdict which the evidence supports. We respectfully ask you to return a
verdict of guilty.;' (Tr., p.160, Ls.16-24.)
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The prosecutor presented a proper closing argument. 1

He discussed the

evidence that was presented on the record, argued why that evidence supported a
conviction, and helped the jury to recognize the proper inference that arose from that
evidence: that Rivera meant to permanently deprive Ms. Hulsizer of her wallet. Rivera's
argument that inferences can only be based on direct evidence is wholly contrary to the
applicable legal standards. See Porter, 130 Idaho at 786, 948 P.2d at 141 (prosecutors
may properly discuss inferences arising from the evidence); Reynolds, 120 Idaho at
450, 816 P.2d at 1007 (prosecutor may properly make remarks based on the record
which concern matters of common experience).

Rivera has failed to show that the

prosecutor committed any misconduct, and the district court should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm Rivera's felony conviction
for grand theft.

DATED this 28th day of September, 2011.

RI'&~ __ . . ~P!=Nr.l=R

Deputy Attorney General

1

Rather than rely on the merits of his own argument, Rivera tries to bolster his claims
by attempting to smear the reputation of the prosecutor who tried this case through
references to prior claims of misconduct that have arisen in Kootenai County.
(Appellant's brief, p.16, n.5.) None of the cited cases deal with the prosecutor in this
case. This attack on the reputation of the prosecutor is unfair and should be rejected by
this Court.
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